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THE FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT: STATE
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE NARROWING OF
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
As many Americans struggled to balance the demands of both
work and family life, President Clinton signed the Family Medical
Leave Act (FMLA)' into law in 1993. The FMLA was the culmina-
tion of several years of debate about family policy.2 As more women
entered the workforce, the traditional role of women as the sole
caretakers of the home and children began to erode, making it
increasingly difficult for married couples to balance the demands of
work and family.3 Women disproportionately bear family responsi-
bilities because of historical stereotypes.' Policy-makers intended
the FMLA to remedy this problem by mandating a family leave
policy that treated men and women equally with respect to family
obligations.5
The FMLA attempts to facilitate women's success in the
workplace6 by mandating that employers grant medical leave to
employees who need to care for a sick relative or child.7 Although
the Act applies to men as well as women, it recognizes that women
are often hindered in their careers due to the fact that society places
more of the burden of caring for the family on women.8 Conse-
quently, women more frequently need an extended leave period to
care for a newborn, an adopted child or an elderly relative.9
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
2. See Samuel Issacharoff& Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodat-
ing the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2179-92 (1994) (describing the legal
path that led to the enactment of the FMLA).
3. See generally Alan J. Hawkins & Ann C. Crouter, Without Map or Compass: Finding
the Way in Contemporary Dual-Earner Marriages, in JACQUELINE V. LERNER & NANCY L.
GALAMBOS, EMPLOYED MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN 211 (1991) (describing the family
difficulties that married men and women face when both work).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 26-33.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 59-72.
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(bX4) (1994) (stating that the purpose of the FMLA is to
"minimize the potential for employment discrimination on the basis of sex by ensuring
generally that leave is available for eligible medical reasons").
7. Id. § 2612.
8. See generally ARLIE HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHFT: WORKING
PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989) (describing case studies of several families
with different socio-economic backgrounds showing that women bear much more domestic
responsibility than men in terms of caring for sick children than men).
9. COMM'N ON FAmmy AND MED. LEAVE, A WORKABLE BALANCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE POLICIES 149 (1996) [hereinafter A WORKABLE BALANCE].
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Recent Supreme Court decisions use the doctrine of sovereign
immunity to limit the ability of private plaintiffs to sue state
governments, 0 jeopardizing the ability of state employees to sue
their employers for FMLA violations." The sovereign immunity
doctrine asserts that a citizen cannot sue a state government for
damages without its consent. 2  Until recently, Congress had
authority to abrogate state immunity with legislation passed
pursuant to either the Commerce Clause" or the Fourteenth
Amendment. 4 In Seminole Tribe v. Florida,5 however, the
Supreme Court limited Congress' authority to abrogate state
immunity under legislation passed pursuant to the Fourteenth
10. E.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) ("[W]e hold that the ADEA
is not a valid exercise of Congress's power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
ADEA's purported abrogation of the states' sovereign immunity is accordingly invalid.");
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) ("We hold that the powers delegated to Congress
under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the power to subject
nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state courts."); Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) ("The Eleventh Amendment prohibits Congress from making the State
of Florida capable of being sued in federal court.").
11. A state employee may have a "right" to take family leave under a state law similar to
the FMLA. Cf Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91-93 (noting that most states have laws prohibiting
discrimination based on age). In this sense, the issue of state sovereignty is really about
federalism: a state government may choose to enact a law granting its employees the same
rights conferred by the FMLA. This issue is more than academic because it limits the ability
of Congress, and the federal government in general, to determine what legislation is necessary
to enforce the civil rights guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81
("The ultimate interpretation and determination of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
meaning remains the province of the Judicial Branch."); see also Robert C. Post & Reva Siegel,
Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel,
110 YALE L.J. 441, 508 (2000) (noting the importance of Congress' role in enacting anti-
discrimination legislation to the overall civil rights movement).
The state sovereignty decisions do not render the FMLA invalid, but the remedies
available to a state employee become limited. The FMLA applies to state governments and
the federal government can bring a suit for violations. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 759-60
(emphasizing that states are not immune from the federal law, only immune from a suit
brought by a private citizen under federal law). "The difference between a suit by the United
States on behalf of the employees and a suit by the employees implicates a rule that the
National Government must itselfdeem the case of sufficient importance to take action against
the State .... " Id. at 2269. This does not provide a remedy to individual victims; its only
advantage is its deterrent effect on states. See also Gregg A. Rubenstein, Note, The Eleventh
Amendment, Federal Employment Laws. and State Employees: Rikhts Without Remedies?. 78
B.U. L. REV. 621. 632-33 (1998) (describing how the effect of the Eleventh Amendment is
"substantive" and not "procedural" when it limits the forum in which an individual can bring
a law suit).
12. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 711-31 (explaining the history and purpose of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity).
13. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8; Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 21 (1988), overruled
by Seminole, 517 U.S. at 61-73.
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976).
15. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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Amendment.' Since the Seminole decision, the Supreme Court has
re-examined what is meant by legislation passed pursuant to
Congress' authority under section five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 17  Consequently, the doctrine of sovereign immunity has
become the impetus to limit congress' ability to enforce the equal
protection clause.
It is uncontested that Congress has the authority to abrogate
states' sovereign immunity with legislation passed pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment.' Consequently, the pivotal issue is
determining what is Fourteenth Amendment legislation. 9 Despite
Congress' intent to use the FMLA to remedy gender
discrimination,' the majority of courts have held that the FMLA is
not Fourteenth Amendment legislation.2' If the FMLA was not
passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress does not
have the authority to abrogate state immunity under the FMLA,
limiting the ability of Congress to enforce equal protection
16. Id. at 64-66.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
avprouriate legislation, the provisions of this article."); City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
516-36 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers because
it was "substantive" and not "remedial"); see also Roger C. Hartley, The New Federalism and
the ADA- State Sovereign Immunity from Private Damage Suits After Boerne, 24 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 481, 489-502 (1998) ("[The [Boerne] Court introduced what is now called
the 'congruence and proportionality' test. [It] permits the Court to probe more deeply the telic
relationship between the legislation that regulates constitutional conduct by the states and
the Fourteenth Amendment violations to be prevented or remedied."). The Boerne decision
"contains all the analytic tools needed to put real teeth into Seminole Tribe's constriction of
Congress's [sic) authority to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit
in federal court." Id. at 496. The Boerne decision, however, was an incomplete analysis. See
Post & Siegel, supra note 11, at 458 (calling Boerne ambiguous because it did "not specify
what should count as equal protection violations for purposes of applying the test"). The most
important implication of Boerne has been highlighted in subsequent interpretations that
narrowly construe the congruence and proportionality test. See Hartley, supra, at 501; Post
& Seigel, supra note 11, at 459 (criticizing the Court in Kimel for "harshly" misconstruing the
Boerne decision).
18. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) ("We think that Congress may, in
determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which are
constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.").
19. James Leonard, The Shadows of Unconstitutionality: How the New Federalism May
Affect theAnti-Discrimination Mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV.
91, 99-100 (2000); see also Post & Siegel, supra note 11, at 459 ("To determine whether Section
5 legislation is congruent and proportional to the goal of remedying or deterring violations of
the Fourteenth Amendment, one must first identify the class of violations that Congress is
empowered to remedy or deter.").
20. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4) (1994).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 137-49.
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guarantees for women.22 A minority of courts have recognized that
the FMLA is a valid exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment
powers."3 These courts have held that Congress has the authority
to abrogate immunity, thereby providing a private cause of action
under the FMLA for damages sustained by state employees.24
This Note argues that Congress has the authority to abrogate
state immunity for FMLA causes of action because the FMLA
directly remedies gender discrimination. The first part of this Note
looks at the history of women in the workforce and the policies
behind the enactment of the FMLA. The second part examines the
development of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. The third part examines how these
developments have caused courts to re-examine the scope of
Fourteenth Amendment protection for state employees. The fourth
section examines cases in which states invoked Eleventh
Amendment defenses to FMLA actions and analyzes the arguments
over whether the FMLA is passed pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment. This section also analyzes the impact Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents' has had in the determination of whether the
FMLA is Fourteenth Amendment legislation. Finally, this Note
concludes by arguing that the FMLA is passed pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment because it remedies past gender
discrimination. This Note also concludes that to hold that the
FMLA is not Fourteenth Amendment legislation would eviscerate
the civil rights advances women have made because it alters the
scope of what is understood to remedy gender discrimination.
THE FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT: HISTORY AND POLICY
Women and Family: Experiences of Women Entering the
Workforce
The entrance of women into the workforce has forced society to
re-examine how both men and women value and balance the
demands of work and family.26 Although certain groups of women
have worked outside the home in some capacity throughout
22. See infra text accompanying notes 137-49.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 150, 167.
24. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
25, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
26. See generally HOCmSCHILD & MACHUNG, supra note 8 (describing how families with
two working parents struggle to cope with family obligations).
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history,27 historical gender roles dictate that women bear most of
the domestic responsibilities for the family.' This historical role
has made it difficult for women to achieve full equality in the
workplace. 29
The ability to balance work and family or, alternately, to be
forced to choose between work and family, was characterized
exclusively as a "women's issue." ' If the workplace fails to
accommodate family demands, it will adversely impact women."'
Men have families too, but social pressure pushes women into
assuming more responsibility for family life.32 When workplaces do
not accommodate family responsibilities such as childcare or caring
for an ill relative, historical gender roles mean that women are the
default caretakers. 3
The legacy of gender roles require that, in order for women to
achieve true equality in the workplace, the workplace must adjust
to family needs.3 This requires not treating family problems as a
women's issue by adopting a gender-neutral leave policy.35 This is
27. Often overlooked, many women have always worked outside of the home. E.g., ANITA
ILTA GAREY, WEAVING WORK AND MOTHERHOOD 108-09 (1999) (discussing the "invisibility"
and undercounting of working class women because of how the U.S. census has defined
.employment").
28. See generally HOCHSCHILD & MACHUNG, supra note 8 (discovering that despite both
parents' participation in the workforce, women bear the responsibility of most household and
child- centered work).
29. See generally SUSAN CHIRA, AMOTHER'S PLACE: TAKING THE DEBATE ABouTWORKING
MOTHERS BEYOND GUILT AND BLAME (1998) (arguing that the pressures placed on women to
be "good mothers" inhibits many women from pursuing their careers).
30. Mary Jane Mossman, Challenging "Hidden' Assumptions: (Women) Lawyers and
Family Life, in MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF
MOTHERHOOD 289,297-98 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995). Because
the pressure "to accommodate work and family responsibilities has come from women[, ...
the work and family dilemma has often been perceived as 'a woman's problem."' Id.
31. Id.
32. GAREY, supra note 27, at 8 (discussing how women, reacting to social pressure,
categorize themselves as either prioritizing work or prioritizing family, whereas men do not
face this dichotomy). One might think that this pressure is anachronistic, but women, men
and children are daily bombarded with images from popular culture about how a "good
mother" devotes time to her children. See CHIRA, supra note 29, at 5.
33. Mossman, supra note 30, at 296.
34. See Scott A. Caplan, Note, Parental Leave: The Need for a National Policy to Foster
Sexual Equality, 13 Am. J.L. & MED. 71, 71-73 (1987); see also A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra
note 9, at 57 (noting how the entrance of women into the workforce has increased the tension
between job and family responsibilities).
35. See Mossman, supra note 30, at 298. Mossman focuses specifically on the legal
profession, but the points she raises are applicable to women in all types of workplaces. For
example, she notes that the gender-neutral approach to family leave is "a way of overcoming
the problem of the segregation of mothers within the profession." Id. In other words, it
prevents mothers from having to choose the "Mommy track" and its resultant dim career
prospects. Id.
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precisely the solution Congress adopted with the FMLA. 6 As the
next section demonstrates, the FMLA was not Congress' first
attempt to legislatively remedy gender discrimination in the work
place. Rather, it was the culmination of several other failed
attempts to deal with the inextricably linked problems of gender
inequality and family leave policy.
Development of Gender Discrimination Legislation
Beginning in the 1960s, Congress and the Supreme Court
worked in tandem to chip away at gender discrimination. In 1964,
Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibiting
discrimination based on sex.37 In the 1970s, the Supreme Court
declared classifications based on gender unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantees.38 The
Supreme Court found laws and policies that treated men and
women differently unconstitutional, 9 but still upheld pregnancy-
based classifications.' In ruling that an insurance program that did
not cover pregnancy did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court reasoned that the program "does not exclude anyone from
benefit eligibility because of gender but merely removes one
physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable
disabilities."'1 The Court linked pregnancy- based classifications to
a disability classification, requiring only rational basis review. 2 In
essence, "the courts removed equal protection as the basis of
discrimination claims based on pregnancy."" These decisions left
women vulnerable to discrimination in the workplace based on
biological differences and social tradition."
In an attempt to deal with the biological differences and
stereotypes that create workplace disparity, Congress amended
Title VII in 1978 with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.'" The Act
36. The Act specifies that an "employee" may take leave and never distinguishes between
men and women. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (1994).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
38. See generally Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding as unconstitutional
a statutory classification based on sex); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (same); Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (same).
39. E.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688-90.
40. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495-97 (1974) (upholding a California disability
insurance program that excluded pregnancy).
41. Id. at 496 n.20.
42. Id.
43. Caplan, supra note 34, at 75.
44. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
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stated that pregnant women should be treated the same as
employees with medical disabilities." The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act prevented employers from discriminating
against women because of the condition of pregnancy.4 7
Although the Pregnancy Discrimination Act improved the
availability of benefit coverage for women, it did not protect women
from the full range of gender discrimination." One major
shortcoming was that it attemptedto treat pregnancy as if it were
"gender neutral. 49 All it required was that employers treat
pregnant women as they would employees with medical
disabilities.' By bringing pregnancy under the range of Title VII
protected groups, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act effectively
required employers to ignore the fact that pregnancy, and its
"cultural baggage," 1 is unique to women. 2 Pregnancy, and even the
ability to become pregnant, is the basis of many preconceived roles
and ingrained cultural expectations about the proper role of
women.' "While social and demographic changes of the last thirty
years have transformed the U.S. workforce, traditional attitudes
and stereotypes about gender roles persist at the juncture of
employment and family.... "5' The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
attempted to treat pregnancy as just another forbidden basis of
discrimination without addressing the greater problem: that women
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and
Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1125 (1986).
49. Cf Robin R. Cockey & Deborah A. Jeon, The Family Medical Leave Act at Work:
Getting Employers to Value Families, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 225, 225 (1996).
50. Finley, supra note 48, at 1125.
51. Historically, pregnant women were seen as incapable of working, even if they wished
to work. Id. at 1124 n.20 (noting that in the 1940s the U.S. Department of Labor
recommended that pregnant women refrain from working six weeks before delivery of a child
and for two months afterward).
52. See, e.g., ROSANNA HERTZ, MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS: WOMEN AND MEN IN DUAL-
CAREER MARRIAGES 124-31 (1986) (describing the difficulty career women face at work as a
result of pregnancy).
53. See, e.g., id. at 122.
Parents, older relatives, and influential traditionalists hold expectations about
women's behavior toward children and childrearing that tend to push women in
the opposite direction. The traditional attitude that investments in family and
children should predominate over career investments and the general cultural
milieu in which many couples were raised weigh heavily on women as they
ponder their decisions about children.
Id.; see also Finley, supra note 48, at 1131-35 (describing stereotypes about pregnant women).
54. See Cockey & Jeon, supra note 49, at 226.
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bear the majority of family responsibilities, of which pregnancy is
only one element.55
The fact that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act addressed only
one kind of family obligation was its second shortcoming. It did not
address other family obligations such as caring for a sick child, an
elderly parent or a spouse.56 This meant that, although employers
could not discriminate on the status of pregnancy, there was no
requirement that employers grant leave for the time required to
care for children.57 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act did not
mandate that employers grant any leave at all. Thus, employers
were free to discharge women on the basis of time commitments
that having children necessitated-not just from the birth of a child,
but from caring for the child throughout childhood. For these
reasons, the Pregnancy Disability Act failed to rectify workplace
disparity between men and women.s8
The FMLA addresses the historical role of women as the family
caretaker by treating family leave as a gender neutral issue. 9 It
does so by covering many different kinds of family obligations and
by mandating leave for both men and women.
The FMLA: The Act, the Rationale and the Effect
The FMLA was adopted in an attempt to balance the competing
demands of work and family.' As the workforce dramatically
changed over the past several decades,6' the demands of family life
55. See generally HOcHSCHILD & MACHUNG, supra note 8 (describing domestic
responsibilites women face).
56. Finley, supra note 48, at 1125.
57. Id. at 1126-27.
58. Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN's L.J. 1, 36-37 (1985) (arguing that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was unlikely
to eradicate sex- based discrimination because it did not grant any job security to women who
took leave). Professor Kay was responding to concerns that then Professor Ruth Bader
Ginsburg had raised earlier. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Benign Classification
in the Context of Sex, 10 CONN. L. REV. 813, 826 (1978).
If Congress is genuinely committed to eradication of sex-based discrimination
and promotion of equal opportunity for women it will . . . provid[e] firm
legislative direction assuring job security, health insurance coverage, and
income maintenance for childbearing women. Women will remain more
restricted than men in their options so long as this problem is brushed under the
rug by the Nation's lawmakers.
Id.
59. Issacharoff& Rosenblum, supra note 2, at 2189-92.
60. See A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra note 9, at v (reprinting a letter written by then
Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich).
61. Donna Lenhoff & Claudia Withers, Implementation of the Family Medical Leave Act:
Toward the Family-Friendly Workplace, 3 Am. U.J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 39, 48 (1994)
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remained the same.'2 The major reason for the enactment of the
FMLA was a recognition that the absence of adequate policies
allowing for extended family leave inhibited women's roles in the
workforce.6"
The FMLA allows employees to take a total of twelve weeks of
leave during any twelve-month period for any of the following
reasons: the birth or adoption of a child, placement of a child for
foster care, to care for an employee's spouse, child or parent with a
serious health condition or for an employee's serious health
condition that renders him/her unable to perform the functions of
his/her job." Instead of barring "employers from penalizing women
either because they are women or because they suffer from the
physical limitations of pregnancy, the FMLA bars employers from
penalizing workers of either gender for taking time to spend with a
new child or to care for sick family members.6 The Act is an
extension of past policies because it includes more than maternity
leave.' The FMLA promotes gender equality not only by mandating
leave for the birth of a child, but by allowing men to take leave for
family responsibilities." It encourages fathers to participate more
in family life, thereby relieving family burdens from women and
reducing stereotypical assumptions that only women are able to
care for sick and young family members." The FMLA combats
gender discrimination in its mandate that employers treat men and
women alike in an area in which men and women historically have
been treated differently.69 The FMLA reduces past discrimination
("The so called nuclear family in which the father works outside the home as the sole
breadwinner and the mother stays as home to care for the children is a thing of the past.").
62. See generally HOCHSCHRILD & MACHUNG, supra note 8 (describing the difficulties
families with two working parents have meeting family demands).
63. See Martin Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1047, 1047 (1994).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994).
65. See Cockey & Jeon, supra note 49, at 229; see also A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra note
9, at 150-55 (profiling several men and women who have taken leave available under the
FMLA for a variety of reasons).
66. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601.
67. The FMLA is gender-neutral; it applies equally to men and women. Evidence has
shown that 41.8% of all leave-takers are men. See A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra note 9, at
149. The fact that women take slightly more leave than men is "partly because men do not
bear children and partly because women are somewhat more likely to care for infants or
seriously ill family members than are men." l at 149-50.
68. See Cockey & Jeon, supra note 49, at 228.
69. See HERTZ, supra note 52, at 125-31 (discussing how some kinds of family problems
tend to fall on women); see also GAREY, supra note 27, at 5-9 (discussing how women are
viewed as either work-oriented or family-oriented). The implication is that women cannot
blend work and family responsibilities because these obligations cannot coexist, whereas
traditionally, part of a man's family obligation was to provide financially for his family. Id.
The FMLA eliminates this dichotomy by making family care a national issue, not a women's
2001] 1019
1020 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 7:1011
caused by gender stereotypes by granting a right to take twelve
weeks of leave, regardless of gender.7
As women began to enter the workforce, the struggle to
eradicate gender discrimination became inextricably linked with
how employers chose to treat pregnancy and other family issues.7
In response to the failure of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to
adequately cope with gender discrimination problems inherent in
pregnancy, Congress enacted the FMLA. 2 As the Supreme Court
developed the doctrine of sovereign immunity, it potentially
narrowed the scope of what is considered to be gender
discrimination legislation. 3  The next section explores the
development of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, emphasizing
the subsequent limiting of what can be considered an exercise of
Congress' Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. It is this
restriction on the ability of Congress to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment that jeopardizes women's rights.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: THE RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The Eleventh Amendment Prior to Seminole Tribe v. Florida'
The Eleventh Amendment states that "the Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State or by citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."75 The Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted to
issue.
70. The ability of both men and women to take leave does not necessarily mean that the
stigma associated with taking time off work for family caregiving would dissipate. See
Mossman, spra note 30. at 298-99. Instead of a "mommv track" there might be a "varentina
track.' This phenomenon would mean that, as a society, we would have to change how we
value work and family.
71. See Ginsburg, supra note 58, at 825-27 (describing the difficulty the Supreme Court
had in grappling with gender discrimination cases involving pregnancy); Kay, supra note 58,
at 8-10 (discussing the enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act as a response to the
failure of the Supreme Court to adequately confront gender discrimination and pregnancy).
72. Kay, supra note 58, at 9 (noting that a problem with the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act is that it does not mandate leave). All the Pregnancy Discrimination Act required was
that pregnant women be treated similarly to all disabled employees. Id. It did not require
that any employer have a leave policy. Id.
73. See Post & Siegel, supra note 11, at 466-72 (discussing the federalism and separation
of powers issues underlying the doctrine of sovereign immunity).
74. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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recognize immunity from suit as an aspect of state sovereignty.7 6
Historically, this amendment has barred lawsuits brought by
citizens of a foreign state or country against a state or arm of the
state, as well as lawsuits brought by a citizen of a state against
his/her own state government."
Eleventh Amendment analysis is fraught with issues of
federalism and separation of powers.7 At the heart of the debate is
the role of the federal government in enforcing individual rights. 9
Recent challenges to federal statutes under. the Eleventh
Amendment,' echoing the states' rights sentiments expressed by
Tenth Amendment 8 challenges to federal laws, 2 threaten the
76. See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note 11, at 632 (introducing Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence). This is how the Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment; however,
some scholars have rejected this concept outright. See Aldl Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1481-84 (1987) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment
embodies no general principle of sovereign immunity).
77. See Rubenstein, supra note 12, at 632.
78. E.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 11, at 456-59 (arguing that Kimel limits Congress'
ability to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and reasserts the role of the Court in
determining the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment); Jeffery G. Homrig,
Note, Alden v. Maine: A New Genre of Federalism Shifts the Balance of Power, 89 CAL. L. REV.
183,184 (2001) (arguing that the way the court has interpreted sovereign immunity "enabl [es]
states to undercut power properly delegated to the federal government by the Constitution").
79. E.g., Amar, supra note 76, at 1426-27 ("T]he Constitution's political structure of
federalism and sovereignty is designed to protect, not defeat, its legal substance of individual
rights. I seek to counter the Supreme Court's version of federalism and sovereignty with the
framer's version [and) ... to replace... government sovereignty with popular sovereignty.");
Homrig, supra note 78, at 184 ("Alden also disenfranchises individuals by placing the right
to enforce federal law against the states solely in the hands of the federal government. Thus,
this decision will likely frustrate the expectations of those individuals who rely on the
protections of federal law by denying them redress for a state's invasion of their rights.").
80. E.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 958-59 (2001)
(challenging the Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,
81-92 (2000) (challenging the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
81. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.").
82. See Rubenstein, supra note 11. at 627 (noting that to "better appreciate the current
Eleventh Amendment challenges to federal emnloyment laws as applied to the states," a
review of Tenth Amendment challenges is helpful). For example, when Congress extended
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994), to state employees in 1974, a
coalition of cities, states and intergovernmental bodies challenged its constitutionality under
the Tenth Amendment, Natl League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,851 (1976), arguing that
this extension usurped traditional governmental functions. Id.; see also Rubenstein, supra
note 11, at 628-29 (summarizing the "traditional government functions" argument). The
Court in National League of Cities agreed that the extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) to state employees violated the Tenth Amendment. Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S.
at 852. However, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985),
overturned National League of Cities. In determining whether San Antonio's transit authority
was subject to FLSA requirements the majority rejected the traditional/nontraditional
distinction of National League of Cities. Garcia, 426 U.S. at 556-57. Instead, the limitations
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ability of the federal government to enforce individual civil
rights-such as women's rights-through congressional legislation.'
State immunity from lawsuits has never been absolute."
Historically, there have been "two sources of constitutional power
that allow Congress to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity: the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce
Clause."' Abrogating state immunity with Fourteenth Amendment
legislation is uncontested because the Fourteenth Amendment was
created to deliberately alter the balance of power between state
governments and the federal government.' Although the
enforcement section of the Fourteenth Amendment is silent about
its relationship to the Eleventh Amendment, "the Eleventh
Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it
embodies... are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions
of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.""7 In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, s
the Court held that the language of the enforcement provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the authority to enforce
the Amendment by appropriate legislation. 9 The Court further held
that the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the ability to
authorize private suits against state governments.' The Court's
rationale was that the Fourteenth Amendment contains an express
grant of congressional authority to legislate in areas that had been
previously constitutionally prohibited: enforcing civil rights.91
on the federal government's exercise of Commerce Clause power can be found in the structure
of the government: states can lobby Congress if they feel their sovereignty is being infringed.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550. As National League of Cities and Garcia demonstrate, states have
failed to avoid the reach of federal labor laws by invoking the Tenth Amendment. See
Rubenstein, supra note 12, at 627-32. The Eleventh Amendment is a natural extension of the
on-going debate about federalism.
83. Post & Siegel, supra note 11, at 503-09 (emphasizing the role of the federal
government in enforcing civil rights and the erosion of this ability in light of the Court's
decisions in Morrision and Kimel).
84. E.g., Philbrick v. Univ. of Conn., 90 F. Supp. 2d 195, 197 (D. Conn. 2000) ("ITihere are
two ways in which a state may be divested of its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.")
(citing Close v. New York, 125 F. 3d 31 (2d Cir. 1997)). Congress can abrogate immunity
through statutes or a state can waive immunity. Id. This Note focuses on the authority of
Congress to abrogate immunity and will not address waiver.
85. Rubenstein, supra note 11, at 621.
86. See Fitzatrick v. Bitzer. 427 U.S. 445. 454 (1976) ("The orohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States, and they are to a degree restrictions of
state uower. It is these which Congress is emuowered to enforce .... Such enforcement is no
invasion of State sovereignty.' (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880)).
87. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 (citation omitted).
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Prior to Seminole, it was thought that Congress also had the
authority to abrogate immunity with legislation passed pursuant to
the Commerce Clause.92 The rationale was that:
By giving Congress plenary authority to regulate commerce, the
States relinquished their immunity where Congress finds it
necessary, in exercising this authority to render them liable.
Since the commerce power can displace state regulation, a
conclusion that Congress may not create a damages remedy
against the States would sometimes mean that no one can do
SO. 
9
In other words, by ratifying the part of the Constitution that gives
Congress the power to regulate commerce, states surrendered a
portion of their immunity from suit.94
Justice Scalia wrote a vigorous dissent in Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas,9" arguing that Congress had no authority to set aside
state immunity with Commerce Clause legislation." He stated:
As suggested above, if the Article I commerce power enables
abrogation of state sovereign immunity, so do all the other
Article I powers. An interpretation of the original Constitution
which permits Congress to eliminate sovereign immunity only
if it wants to renders the doctrine a practical nullity and is
therefore unreasonable.9 7
Although the Court was divided as to whether Congress had the
authority to abrogate state immunity under the Commerce Clause,
there was no disagreement as to the Fourteenth Amendment.98
The Supreme Court overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas in
1996 with Seminole Tribe v. Florida.9  The Seminole decision
represents the beginning of a shift in Eleventh Amendment
analysis."°  The Seminole decision's potential effect on federal
92. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (plurality), overruled by
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 427 U.S. 44,64-67 (1996).
93. Id. at 3.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 29 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 42.
97. Id.
98. Id. ("The Fourteenth Amendment, on the other hand, was avowedly directed against
the power of the States, and permits abrogation of their sovereign immunity.").
99. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
100. E.g., Carlos Manuel VAzquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106YALEL.J.
1683, 1717 (1997) (arguing that Seminole shifted the focus of Eleventh Amendment immunity
to "immunity from liability, not just from federal jurisdiction"). The implication of this shift
20011 1023
1024 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND ThE LAW [Vol. 7:1011
legislation is the subject of many scholarly articles.' Although
scholars disagree on the scope of its impact,"° Seminole limits the
options available to private plaintiffs bringing suits against state
governments for violations of federal law. Since Seminole, there has
been a wave of lawsuits in which state governments have
successfully invoked Eleventh Amendment immunity."3
In Seminole, the Court held that Congress has no authority to
abrogate state immunity under statutes passed pursuant to the
Commerce Clause.' Congress only has that authority under
legislation enacted pursuant to the Enforcement Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 5 "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment, adopted
well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and the
ratification of the Constitution, operated to alter the pre-existing
balance between state and federal power achieved by Article III and
the Eleventh Amendment."1'c Seminole acknowledged that the
Fourteenth Amendment represents a unique shift in federalism in
that it grants the federal government more power than is found in
the rest of the Constitution.' 7 The Court rejected the Union Gas
rationale that when the states ratified the Constitution they
automatically gave up a portion of their immunity under the
Commerce Clause.1'e
in focus is that the concept of immunity changes from being a question of whether federal
court has jurisdiction under Article III, to immunity from the actual suit. Id.
101. E.g., Gregory J. Newman, The Seminole Decision's Effect on Title IX Claims:
Blockading the Path of Least Resistance, 46 EMORY L.J. 1739, 1778-79 (1997) (arguing that
the real effect of the Seminole decision was to narrow the options for violations of Title IX).
See generally Symposium, American Association of Law Schools Minisymposium
Interdisciplinary Aspects of Seminole Tribe v. Florida: State Sovereign Immunity in the
Context of Antitrust, Bankruptcy, Civil Rights and Environmental Law, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
1393 (1997) (discussing Seminole's impact on a variety of areas of the law).
102. See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 72-73 n.16 (criticizing Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion
that noted that the impact of Seminole would be to prohibit federal jurisdiction over a wide
range of suits in which the federal government has exclusive authority to legislate, (i.e.
copyright), as "exaggerated both in its substance and in its significance").
103. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 967-68 (2001)
(invoking Eleventh Amendment immunity for the ADA); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62, 90 (2000) (involving the state of Florida and the University of Florida invoking
Eleventh Amendment immunity for lawsuits brought under the ADA and the ADEA); Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 711-12 (1999) (invoking Eleventh Amendment immunity for the
FLSA); Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691
(1999) (holding that sovereign immunity was not validly abrogated under the Trademark
Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA)).
104. See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 76.
105. See id. at 59.
106. See id. at 65-66.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 66.
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In Seminole, the Court announced a two-part test to determine
if Congress can abrogate state immunity: (1) whether Congress
expressed a clear legislative intent to abrogate state immunity, and
(2) whether Congress acted under proper constitutional authority. "
Congress can amend a statute to provide legislative intent to
abrogate immunity, thereby satisfying the first prong of the test.
Consequently, the most important aspect of the Seminole test is to
determine whether Congress acted under the appropriate
authority.11 After all, no matter how much Congress intends to
abrogate immunity, if it is unconstitutional to do so, intent is
irrelevant.
It is clear that Seminole opened the door for a wide range of
suits from states invoking immunity and limited the enforcement
capabilities of the federal government."' In his dissent in Seminole,
Justice Stevens claimed that the potential effect of the Court's
decision could not be overemphasized because "it prevents Congress
from providing a federal forum for a broad range of actions against
States . .. [including] regulation of our vast national economy.""
Justice Stevens feared that Congress would be precluded from
providing "a private federal cause of action against a State or its
Governor, for the violation of a federal right."11
Since Seminole, the Court has reaffirmed its central holding
that state governments are immune from lawsuits for violation of
laws passed pursuant to Congress' Commerce Clause authority."4
The crucial question is what legislation is within Congress'
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority? The next section
describes the Court's narrowing interpretation of what constitutes
Fourteenth Amendment legislation.
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
The Court's decision in Seminole placed renewed emphasis on
the meaning of Fourteenth Amendment legislation. A series of
109. See id. at 55-58.
110. See Melanie Hochberg, Note, Protecting Students Against Peer Sexual Harassment:
Congress's Constitutional Powers to Pass Title IX, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 235, 261 (1999) ("[T]he
inquiry into what power Congress used to enact a law becomes extremely important and often
dispositive to the question of abrogation.").
111. V'zquez, supra note 100, at 1720-22.
112. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. See id. (citation omitted).
114. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 960 (2001); Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,90 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999); Coll.
Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999).
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cases were decided in an attempt to clarify what legislation is
passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. In doing so, the
Court is narrowing Congress' ability to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment and remedy gender discrimination.
City of Boerne v. Flores"6
Boerne involved the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993.11 The Court held that Congress
exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers because
RFRA was not remedial in nature and created additional
substantive rights."7 In doing so Boerne developed the "congruence
and proportionality" test,"' which considers whether the remedy in
the legislation is congruent and proportional to the perceived harm.
The Court in Boerne departed from previous interpretations of
the Fourteenth Amendment by giving less deference to Congress
when it "proscribes constitutional state behavior as a means of
deterring or preventing Fourteenth Amendment violations." 9 Prior
cases such as Katzenbach v. Morgan,20 were much more deferential
to Congress' ability to exercise its section five discretion.' Boerne's
congruence and proportionality test created a higher standard of
judicial review of federal laws. 2 The impact of the Boerne approach
115. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
116. Id. at 512.
117. Id. at 536. The Court emphasized the remedial nature of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 520 ("The Fourteenth Amendment's history confirms the remedial, rather than
substantive, nature of the Enforcement Clause."). This again reflects the on-going separation
of powers debate. The Court is reserving for itself the role of determining the substance of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000) ("The
ultimate interpretation and determination of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
meaning remains the province of the Judicial Branch.") (citing Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536). But
see id. at 93 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the framers did not intend the Judicial
Branch to determine substantive law).
118. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530 ("While preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial
measures, there must be a congruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved.").
119. Hartley, supra note 17, at 493; see also Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524 ("The remedial and
preventive nature of Congress' enforcement power, and the limitation inherent in the power,
were confirmed in our earliest cases on the Fourteenth Amendment.") (emphasis added).
120. 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (evaluating whether the Voting Rights Act was appropriate
Fourteenth Amendment legislation).
121. Id. at 651 ("Correctly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing
Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also Hartley, supra note 17, at
493-94 (discussing Katzenbach's deference to Congress).
122. See Hartley, supra note 17, at 495 ("[Boerne's] approach is more demanding than the
rational basis test. The 'congruence and proportionality' test permits the Court to probe more
deeply the telic relationship between the legislation that regulates constitutional conduct by
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is that it gives the courts a mechanism by which to enforce
Seminole's holding.123 Boerne's higher standard of congruency and
proportionality limits Congress' ability to create a private right of
action against a state government with legislation that is not
deemed within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. 124  The
implication for legislation such as the FMLA is that Boerne puts the
judicial system in the role of scrutinizing Congress' purpose in
enacting the legislation.' This limits congressional ability to enact
anti-discrimination legislation because it essentially turns Congress
into a fact- finding body by requiring it to prove, through the
legislative record, that the legislation was enacted in response to a
violation of equal protection rights.12' This is a higher level of
judicial scrutiny, which limits Congress' ability to determine what
kind of legislation is necessary to enforce equal protection rights for
women.
Post-Boerne: Further Development of the Meaning of Congruence
and Proportionality
Despite Boerne's potential to limit congressional authority to
enact anti-discrimination legislation, the congruence and
proportionality test is vague as applied.'27 The extent to which the
Court intended to prevent Congress from enacting legislation that
remedies conduct that would not be unconstitutional by its own
the states and the Fourteenth Amendment violations to be prevented or remedied.") (footnotes
omitted).
123. Id. at 496 ("[Boerne] contains all the analytical tools needed to put real teeth in
Seminole Tribe's constriction of Congress's authority to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit in federal court.").
124. E.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 11, at 522 ("[J]udicial applications of the Boerne test
alter the terms in which Congress can participate in the antidiscrimination tradition
inaugurated by the Civil Rights Act of 1964."). Post and Siegel discuss at length the role of
Congress in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly sex discrimination. Id. at
520-21.
125. E.g., Sims v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 219 F. 3d 559, 563-65 (6th Cir. 2000) (examining
legislative history of the FMLA to determine congressional intent); see also A. Christopher
Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's New 'On the
Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 328, 348-53 (2001)
(arguing that the current Court's interpretation of Boerne virtually requires Congress to
engage in specific fact finding in order to enact Fourteenth Amendment legislation).
126. See Bryant & Simeone, supra note 125, at 348-53.
127. E.g., Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519, 533-39 (5th Cir. 2000) (Dennis, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's application of the Boerne test to the FMLA); see
also Post & Siegel, supra note 12, at 522 (noting that the tendency of courts to apply the
Boerne test narrowly "is actually a tool for restraining Congress whenever the Court is
indifferent or hostile to the constitutional values at stake').
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section one analysis is unclear.12 Post-Boerne decisions such as
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents29 and Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett,'30 imply that the Court is
following a narrow reading of Boerne, limiting Congress to enacting
legislation under its Fourteenth Amendment authority that is tied
to the Court's own interpretation of equal protection." Although
both Kimel and Garrett acknowledge that Congress can pass
legislation that remedies and deters a broader "swath of conduct,
including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's
text,"13 2 the lower court's application of Boerne indicates a narrower
conception of Congress' section five enforcement authority.133 To
read Boerne and Kimel as limiting congressional authority to
remedy only conduct by state governments that is already
unconstitutional points toward a finding that the FMLA is not a
valid exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment authority. The
FMLA reduces gender discrimination by not distinguishing between
men and women and by providing a positive grant of leave. This
covers a broader range of activities than would otherwise be
128. Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment gives the judicial system the authority to
review state legislation that discriminates on the basis of gender. See cases cited, supra, note
38. The confusion is over to what extent Congress can prevent discrimination beyond that
which is already unconstitutional. For example, in Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519 (5th
Cir. 2000), the majority, ruling that the FMLA is not Fourteenth Amendment legislation,
interpreted Boerne and Kimel to mean that "Congress's potential authority to enact
prophylactic legislation is directly linked to the level of scrutiny that we apply in assessing
the validity of discriminatory classifications of the targeted type." Id. at 524. In other words,
Congress' authority is limited by the Court's own equal protection analysis. In contrast, the
dissent in Kazmier argued that neither Boerne nor Kimel require Congress to remain in the
range of judicially-enforced equal protection classifications in designing anti-discrimination
legislation. Id at 534-35 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
129. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
130. 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
131. E.g., Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 958-95 (reviewing the Court's decisions holding that
discrimination against the disabled is subject only to a rational basis review). Consequently,
the Court held that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), provided protection above
"rational basis review and was, therefore, a substantive rewriting of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 968. "[To uphold the Act's application to the States would allow
Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court in Cleburne
[holding that discrimination against the disabled is subject to rational basis review]. Section
5 does not so broadly enlarge congressional authority." Id. at 968 (footnote omitted); see also
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81 ("Congress cannot'decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's
restrictions on the States. . . . It has been given the power "to enforce" not the power to
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.') (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 519 (1997)).
132. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81; see also Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963 ("Congress is not limited to
mere legislative repetition of this Court's constitutional jurisprudence.").
133. Post & Siegel, supra note 11, at 521.
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considered violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. Boerne and
Kimel ought not be read so narrowly.
The application of Boerne, and later Kimel, to the FMLA has
created some confusion among lower courts. As the next section
discusses, most courts-both before and after Kimel-have
concluded that the FMLA is not a valid exercise of Congress'
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers. Prior to Kimel, a
majority of courts held that the FMLA's remedy (twelve weeks of
leave) was not congruent and proportional to remedying gender
discrimination because it conferred a substantive right. After
Kimel, courts have elaborated on Boerne's test by more closely
examining both the right to be remedied and the legislative record
indicating a history of discrimination. Post- Kimel courts have
defined the right to be remedied as something other than gender
discrimination, thereby avoiding the heightened scrutiny gender
discrimination carries, which grants Congress broad remedial
authority. This Note argues that this approach is erroneous
because it mischaracterizes the purpose and the legislative history
of the FMLA and misconstrues Congress' authority to remedy
gender discrimination and enforce the equal protection clause in a
meaningful way for women.
THE CASES: THE FMLA AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The shift in Eleventh Amendment doctrine affects the efficacy
of the FMLA because state governments are large employers. From
state universities and the state police to the myriad other branches
of state government agencies, state governments employ numerous
people. If the FMLA is not considered a law enacted pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment, everyone working for state governments
would be without a cause of action against their employers for
violations of the FMLA. State immunity denies a private cause of
action for damages.'3 If a person is fired for taking a significant
amount of time off of work to care for a sick relative or child, the
injury to his/her family is monetary. If state governments are
immune from private suits for many damages, that family is
without an adequate remedy.
Furthermore, to hold that the FMLA is not Fourteenth Amend-
ment legislation impedes the progress of women's rights because it
reduces Congress' ability to draft effective anti-discrimination
134. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
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legislation.1" As discussed above, Congress developed the FMLA
after years of failed attempts by both itself and the Supreme Court
to develop a workable solution to the problem of gender
discrimination and family obligations *in the workplace.1 3 6  A
majority of the courts that have considered whether the FMLA is
Fourteenth Amendment legislation have concluded that it is not.
These courts misconstrued both the group of people the FMLA was
designed to help and the remedial purpose of the Act.
The Application of Fourteenth Amendment Analysis to the FMLA:
Pre-Kimel
The majority of the cases addressing Eleventh Amendment
challenges to the FMLA held that Congress did not abrogate state
immunity.3 7 In general, prior to the Court's decision in Kimel, most
courts concluded that the FMLA confers a substantive right,
altering the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."' Kilvitis
v. County of Luzerne39 exemplifies this approach. In determining
whether the FMLA was validly enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment, the court applied a three-part test developed thirty
years ago in Katzenbach v. Morgan:4 ° "(1) whether the statute may
135. See, e.g., Knussman v. Maryland, 935 F. Supp. 659, 662 (D. Md. 1996) (involving a
Maryland state trooper who was not allowed to take leave under the FMILA for the birth of
his child). Incredibly, he was told that because he was a man he could not take the leave,
because caring for children was women's work. Id. This is a recent example of how gender
roles persistently invade the workplace. It also illustrates why the FMLA is necessary to help
eliminate the type of gender stereotyping about family obligations that this Maryland state
trooper experienced. See also Cockey & Jeon, supra note 49, at 225-26.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 37-72.
137. See Townsel v. Missouri, 233 F.3d 1094,1095 (8th Cir. 2000); Thompson v. Ohio State
Univ., No. 98-3613, 2000 WL 1721038, at *1 (6th Cir., Nov. 8, 2000 ); Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d
61,69 (2d Cir. 2000); Sims v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 219 F.3d 559,566 (6th Cir. 2000); Kazmier
v. Midman, 225 F.3d 519, 533 (5th Cir. 2000); Chittister v. Dep't of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 226
F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2000); Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Tr., 193 F.3d 1214, 1219 (11th
Cir. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001); Darby v. Hinds County Dep't of
Human Servs., No. 3:98CV68LN, 1999 WL 1426105, at *1 (S.D. Miss, Aug. 11, 1999); Bylsma
v. Bailey, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1211,1234 (M.D. Ala. 2001); Philbrickv. Univ. of Conn., 90 F. Supp.
2d 195, 201 (D. Conn 2000); Cohen v. Neb. Dep't of Admin. Servs., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1046
(D. Neb. 2000); Kilvitis v. County of Luzerne, 52 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410-11 (M.D. Pa. 1999);
Driesse v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 26 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1998); McGregor v. Goord,
18 F. Supp. 2d 204,209 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
138. E.g., Sims, 219 F.3d at 566 (holding that the broad substantive requirements the
FMLA imposes on state governments mean that the FMLA is not a valid exercise of Congress'
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment). The rationale is that nothing in the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees leave. Id. By granting leave as a statutory right, it confers a right
above and beyond the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
139. 52 F. Supp. 2d 403 (M.D. Pa. 1999).
140. 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
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be regarded as an enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) whether the statute is plainly
adapted to its enforcement goal; and (3) whether the statute is
consistent with the Constitution.""" Kilvitis found congressional
intent to invoke the Equal Protection Clause in the statute itself;14
2
it did not examine the legislative history.'" Applying Boerne's
congruent and portionality test to the second prong of Katzenbach's
analysis, Kilvitis found that the FMLA was not Fourteenth
Amendment legislation.'" The court reasoned that the FMLA's
grant of twelve weeks of leave creates an economic entitlement and
is, therefore, a substantive alteration of the Fourteenth
Amendment." The court stated that "[tihe FMLA does not add
anything to the existing prohibitions against gender discrimination,
except to the extent that it creates a statutory entitlement to 12
weeks of leave."'" The court did not examine the "existing
prohibitions" (i.e. constitutional or legislative), nor did it examine
the extent to which Congress can legislatively cover a wider range
of discriminatory conduct than is already protected by the courts." 7
The court ended its inquiry at the fact that leave is "substantive"
because it confers a benefit"' and did not examine the extent to
which a "benefit" may actually serve a remedial purpose. Under the
FMLA, the purpose of the "benefit" of leave is to remedy the fact
that women historically bear a disproportionate amount of family
responsibilities. "'
Prior to Kimel, a handful of courts decided that the FMLA was
enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. 50 None of the
141. Kilvitis, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 408 (citing Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651).
142. 1d (citingMcGregor, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 207 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601(bX4) & (5) (1994)).
Other courts that examined this issue at the same time were consistent with Kilvitis' line of
reasoning. E.g., Dries8e, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1332 ; McGregor, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 207.
143. The only case prior to Kimel that examined the legislative history was the Eleventh
Circuit in Garrett v. University of Alabama Board of Trustees., 193 F.3d 1214, 1220 (11th Cir.
1999). The Eleventh Circuit seemed to anticipate the arguments in Kimel and frequently
cited the circuit court opinion. Id. at 1219. Garrett concluded that the FMLA's legislative
history was "insufficient to indicate Congress had identified particular unconstitutional
actions by the states." Id. at 1220.
144. Kilvitis, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 408-09.
145. Id. at 409-10.
146. Id. at 410.
147. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
148. Kilvitis, 52 F. Supp.'2d at 410.
149. See supra notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
150. Jolliffe v. Mitchel, 986 F. Supp. 339,343 (W.D. Va. 1997); Biddlecome v. Univ. of Tex.,
No. 96-1872, 1997 WL 124220, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 1997); see also Knusaman v.
Maryland, 935 F. Supp. 659, 663 (D. Md. 1996) (finding intent to abrogate, but declining to
decide if the FMLA was validly enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment because the
issue was not raised by counsel).
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courts developed their rationales to the same extent as the majority
approach, but all recognized that Congress intended the FMLA to
remedy workplace gender disparity pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment.1"' On this point, the minority position did not differ
from the majority: both approaches found congressional intent to
invoke the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 Where the opinions differed
was that none of the courts that found that the FMLA was enacted
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Katzenbach
test or Boerne's congruence and proportionality test. Consequently,
the minority approach did not examine whether the FMLA could be
enacted pursuant to Congress' section five enforcement powers.
The result was that by the time the Supreme Court decided
Kimel, elaborating on Boerne's test, the only courts that had applied
Boerne found that the FMLA was not Fourteenth Amendment
legislation. This does not mean that Boerne's analysis dictates that
one must find that the FMLA is not Fourteenth Amendment
legislation. 53  Particularly when addressing race or gender
discrimination, Congress has the "ability to enact broad prophylactic
legislation."' 5 Nothing in Boerne requires that the legislation be
limited to remedying whatwould already be unconstitutional under
section one of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 If that were the case,
section five would be useless because one could already seek a
remedy under section one in the courts. Consequently, the fact that
the FMLA grants a right to take leave to both men'and women
ought not defeat the legislation because Congress' remedial powers
151. Jolliffe, 986 F. Supp. at 342.
Consistent with its concern about inequality in the work place, Congress
explained that the purpose of the FMLA is to achieve a balance between the
needs of the workplace "in a manner that, consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, minimizes the potential for employment
discrimination on the basis of sex by ensuring generally that leave is available
for eligible medical reasons.
Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2601(bX4) (1994)).
152. In fact, the court in Biddlecome v. University of Texas, No. 96-1872, 1997 WL 124220
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 1997), went further than the statute itself and looked to the legislative
history of the FMLA: stating "[tlhe legislative history of the FMLA states that it 'is based not
only on the Commerce Clause, but also on the guarantees of equal protection and due process
embodied in the 14th Amendment."' Id. at *3 (quoting S. REP. No. 103-3, at 18 (1993)).
153. See Post & Siegel, supra note 11, at 521-22 (discussing the tendency of lower courts
to narrowly construe Boerne's holding).
154. Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519, 543 (5th Cir. 2000) (Dennis, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 541-42 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW § 5-17, at
959-60 (3d ed. 1999)); see also Post & Siegel, supra note 12, at 522 ("[I]t is clear that concerns
about preserving the Court's interpretive authority do not require the Court to impose narrow
tailoring or antidiscrimination legislation to ensure that it closely conforms to the terms of
the Court's own Section 1 jurisprudence.*).
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under section five for race and gender discrimination can cover a
wider range of conduct,' including a positive right to take leave.
Application of Fourteenth Amendment Analysis to the FMLA:
Post-Kimel
Since Kimel, lower courts have developed a more nuanced
approach to the issue of whether the FMLA was validly enacted
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Kimel elaborated upon
Boerne's congruence and proportionality test. Kimel has been
interpreted as asking: (1) what the constitutional problem is that
Congress is trying to remedy and (2) whether there has been a
demonstrated history and pattern of discrimination by state
governments.'57 The Court then asked whether the remedy in the
legislation was congruent and proportional to the constitutional
right identified by looking at the legislative history.15 All of the
circuit courts have held, in applying this test, that the FMLA is not
Fourteenth Amendment legislation." 9  As this section will
demonstrate, Kimel's interpretation of the congruence and
proportionality test need not dictate that the FMLA is not validly
enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, an honest
examination of the reasons Congress passed the FMLA, as well as
an understanding of the linked nature of gender discrimination and
workplace leave"6 lead to the conclusion, under Kimel, that the
FMLA is valid Fourteenth Amendment legislation.
The first element of Kimel's analysis asks the court to "identify
the constitutional evil that Congress sought to remedy with the
FMLA.""'6 This element has allowed some courts to characterize the
FMLA as something other than gender discrimination legislation.
For example, the Fifth Circuit, in Kazmier v. Widmann,"6'
characterized the section in the FMLA that allows a person to take
156. See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 11, at 521-22.
157. E.g., Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 524-25. The Supreme Court solidified this two-part test in
Board of Trustees of the University ofAlabama v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 963-65 (2001), by
asking first what unconstitutional conduct Congress is trying to remedy, and second, whether
there have been legislative findings demonstrating a history of constitutional discrimination
by state governments.
158. E.g., Chittister v. Dep't of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d 223, 228-29 (3d Cir. 2000).
159. Id. at 229; Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519,528 (5th Cir. 2000); Sims v. Univ. of
Cincinnati, 219 F.3d 559, 566 (6th Cir. 2000); Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2000);
Townsel v. Missouri, 233 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000).
160. See Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 2, at 2159-92 (overviewing the difficulty in
addressing gender-based discrimination that involves working women and maternity).
161. Sims, 219 F.3d at 562.
162. 225 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2000).
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time off of work for his/her own illness as discrimination based on
pregnancy, not on sex.' This choice of phrasing is important
because the Supreme Court has held that pregnancy is a
permissible basis for discrimination.'" By choosing not to describe
the constitutional violation being remedied as sex discrimination,
the court makes the constitutional right at stake less alarming. The
means chosen must be congruent and proportional to the right at
stake; if the right at stake does not have heightened constitutional
scrutiny, the remedy cannot be as drastic because it would no longer
be congruent and proportional. 6 ' To characterize the FMLA as
something other than gender discrimination allows the court to
avoid the fact that gender carries with it heightened constitutional
review. 16
The fact that gender carries heightened review distinguishes
the FMLA cases from Kimel and Garrett. The cases upon which
courts such as Kazmier rely involve constitutional rights in which
Congress does not have recognized broad remedial powers. In fact,
the only court to hold that the FMLA can be distinguished from the
cases involving the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) did so on this
ground. In Serafin v. Connecticut Department of Mental Health and
Addiction Services,167 on a motion to rehear the case in light of
Kimel, the court distinguished Kimel stating that "[glender
discrimination also triggers greater authority for congressional
legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment than age
163. Id. at 527 ("As an initial matter, we reject the notion that subsection (D) targets sex
discrimination. The legislative record demonstrates that Congress was concerned with
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, which is not the same thing as broad based
discrimination on the basis of sex.").
164. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974).
165. Kazmier 225 F.3d at 527. The court also stated that even if the discrimination
addressed was discrimination based upon sex, "it [was] virtually impossible to conceive how
requiring employers to permit employees to take 12 weeks of leave for serious health
conditions could possibly have the effect of preventing sex discrimination." Id. at 528. To
answer the court's question, making it mandatory for employers to provide leave with job
security to either gender takes the focus off of pregnancy. Only women can become pregnant;
therefore, not requiring employers to provide leave at all, or only requiring them to provide
leave to pregnant women, is fraught with discrimination problems. See Finley, supra note 48,
at 1141-42. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act was not as successful as it could have been
because it provided no positive grant of leave. See supra text accompanying notes 46-59. The
FMLA's grant of leave to people for their own health problems remedies gender discrimination
because it makes family issues, including health problems, notjust women's issues but people
issues.
166. See cases cited supra note 38.
167. 118 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D. Conn. 2000).
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discrimination."68  It is for this reason that the proper
characterization of the FMLA as gender discrimination legislation
is crucial:169 it is well established that Congress has greater
remedial authority when the constitutional violation triggers
heightened scrutiny, such as gender discrimination. The second
element of Kimel's analysis is an examination of the legislative
history for evidence of discrimination. 70  The Fifth Circuit
interpreted this to mean that "[b]road, prophylactic legislation must
be congruent with and proportional to actual, identified
constitutional violations by the states."1'' This is an extremely
narrow interpretation of Congress' remedial capabilities. It is also
a departure from earlier decisions, which looked no further than the
statement in the act itself that says the FMLA is intended to
remedy gender discrimination. This examination of the
legislative history further hinders Congress' ability and discretion
to enact legislation that remedies gender discrimination because it
168. Id. at 277. This is the only case after Kimel that finds that the FMLA is validly
enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 278.
169. The Court in both Garrett and Kimel placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact that
the groups in question (the elderly in Kimel and the disabled in Garrett) require only rational
basis review. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 964 (2001) ("States are
not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled,
so longas their actions towards such individuals are rational."). Consequently, the ADA was
not congruent and proportional because it substantively altered the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 968. Likewise in Kimel, the Court used the same rationale stating that "[s]tates may
discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age
classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Kimel v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82 (2000).
170. It is not altogether clear whether this is actually required by Kimel. Justice Dennis'
dissenting opinion in Kazmier v. Widman, 225 F.3d 519, 533 (5th Cir. 2000) argues that it is
not.
[Niothing in Kimel restricts Congress' freedom to choose whether to take
evidence, conduct hearings, seek experts' opinions, or to rely on history,
experience with previous legislation, notice of legislative facts, common
knowledge, common sense, or a combination of such factors. The court has not
and cannot legitimatelyimpose any standard form ofludicially made procedures,
standards, or quantum of evidence requirements upon Congress.
Id. at 537. To read Kimel to require legislative fact finding for Fourteenth Amendment
legislation may raise separation of powers issues. See Bryant & Simeone, supra note 125, at
348-53. Nonetheless, Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 455, emphasizes
that the legislative history of the ADA contains no evidence of discrimination against disabled
people committed by state governments. Id. at 964. An inference can be made that this
requires Congress to engage in legislative fact finding. However, a full discussion of this issue
is beyond the scope of this Note.
171. Kazmier, 225 F.3d. at 526. Justice Rehnquist reiterated this point in Garrett stating
the "legislative record of the ADA, however, simply fails to show that Congress did in fact
identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled."
Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 965.
172. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(bX4) (1994).
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requires Congress to demonstrate a history of gender discrimination
by state governments in order to be able to abrogate state immunity.
Nothing in either the doctrine of sovereign immunity or the history
of Congress' ability to enact Fourteenth Amendment legislation,
supports this requirement.
The reason lower courts are interpreting Kimel to require
evidence this specific is uncertain because it is unclear on what
qualitative grounds public employers are distinguished fromprivate
employers. In other words, if Congress has identified persistent
problems of gender discrimination in the workforce that are
inextricably linked with family responsibilities,173 why are public
employers immune from the same prejudices? It makes no sense to
recognize a problem of gender discrimination in the society at large,
but to refuse to allow Congress to impute those findings to state
governments as employers.
Courts applying the Kimel analysis have been more reluctant
than before to find that the FMLA is validly enacted pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, this interpretation of Kimel or
Boerne is inconsistent with Congress' role in enacting gender anti-
discrimination legislation.17 This interpretation does not accurately
characterize the FMLA as gender discrimination legislation.
Congress clearly intended the FMLA to remedy gender
discrimination. The fact that the Act deals with family leave ought
not defeat Congress' explicit purpose. Classifying family leave as a
medical disability, harkens back to the state of gender
discrimination in the 1970s, and revives all of the gender equity
problems that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was unable to fix.
The FMLA remedies gender equality because it changes the debate
about family issues from being a women's issue, to everybody's
issue. The refusal of courts to classify the FMLA as gender
discrimination legislation allows courts to avoid the issue of
Congress' broader authority to remedy gender discrimination,
compared to disability or age discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the FMLA in an attempt to remedy problems
of gender discrimination in the workplace that result from
anachronistic stereotypes about the role of women within the
family. By taking a gender-neutral approach, and by requiring that
173. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
174. Post & Siegel, supra note 11, at 512-22.
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leave be available to both genders, Congress remedied gender
discrimination by making issues of work and family no longer
exclusively "women's issues."
The revival of the Eleventh Amendment, and the resultant
focus on the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, threatens
Congress' ability to enforce the equal protection guarantees of the
Constitution for women. The Eleventh Amendment has been turned
into an axe with which the Supreme Court chipped away the federal
governments' role in enforcing civil rights. The'denial of Congress'
ability to abrogate states' sovereign immunity with legislation such
as the FMLA prevents Congress from drafting legislation that is a
thoughtful response to past problems in enforcing civil rights for
women. It also denies an adequate remedy to the many people
employed by state governments.
The FMLA ought to be considered as being enacted pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment because it remedies past discrimination
that women have experienced in the workforce. The courts that
refuse to so characterize it, not only misapply Fourteenth
Amendment precedent, but also misconstrue the nature of the Act.
The FMLA is a necessary remedy for women to achieve equality in
the workplace.
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